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TEN TORTURED WORDS: HOW THE FOUNDING FATHERS TRIED TO
PROTECT RELIGION IN AMERICA... AND WHAT'S HAPPENED SINCE.
BY STEPHEN MANSFIELD. NASHVILLE: THOMAS NELSON. 2007.
$26.00.
REVIEWED BY DAVID K. DEWOLFt
TEN TORTURED WORDS by Stephen Mansfield is not a scholarly
work, by the author's own admission. Although he holds a doctorate
from Whitefield Theological Seminary and has written a number of best-
selling books of history and biography, he is not a specialist in early
American history, and he has not attempted to do original research.
Moreover, his book is marred by some embarrassing gaffes, most promi-
nent of which is the back of the dust jacket, which describes the ten tor-
tured words "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . . . ." as having resulted "[i]n the steamy summer of 1787, as
America's founding fathers fashioned their Constitution. . . ." As Chap-
ter 1 accurately describes, the First Amendment was drafted by the new
Congress in 1789 and became law in 1791. The error was undoubtedly
the result of a careless publicist for Thomas Nelson (the publisher), but
there are other examples of a lack of attention to detail.'
t Professor, Gonzaga University School of Law; B.A., Stanford University, 1971; J.D.,
Yale Law School, 1979. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of Mark E.
DeForrest and Robert G. Natelson.
1. An extensive and highly critical review of the book has been written by CHRIS RODDA,
author of LIARS FOR JESUS: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT'S ALTERNATE VERSION OF AMERICAN HISTORY
(2006). The first installment of the review is found at http://www.talk2action.org/story/
2007/8/13/16117/9532/Front Page/_StephenMansfield s quot TenTorturedWordsquot A B
ookReview Part 1_, with links to the second and third installments.
In addition to the dust jacket error, Rodda highlights a sentence in the introduction to Mansfield's
book referring to Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists as having been written "fourteen years
after the First Amendment became law." Chris Rodda, Stephen Mansfield's "Ten Tortured Words-
A Book Review (Part 1), TALK TO ACTION, Aug. 13, 2007, http://www.talk2action.org/story/
2007/8/13/16117/9532/FrontPage/_StephenMansfield_squotTenTorturedWordsquot AB
ook Review Part 1 _. In fact, as Rodda points out, the First Amendment became law in 1791, and it
was barely ten years later that Jefferson wrote the letter. Id. Similarly, Mansfield refers to "the
convention that drafted the First Amendment," when in fact Congress drafted the First Amendment.
Id. These errors do not affect the weight of Mansfield's claims (there is no significant difference
between a ten-year and a fourteen-year gap; Mansfield here misidentifies the body that drafted the
First Amendment, but later in the book he carefully reviews the Congressional debates); but they
provide cheap ammunition for Mansfield's detractors.
The only significant error I noted is the use of an alleged quotation from James Madison, "Relig-
ion is the basis and Foundation of Government." STEPHEN MANSFIELD, TEN TORTURED WORDS:
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Although some savage attacks have been directed at the book, they
can be ascribed more to the overarching thesis of the book than to a con-
cem that, for example, the date for the adoption of the First Amendment
is accurate. Mansfield's overarching thesis is that the popular under-
standing of the adoption of the First Amendment has been badly dis-
torted. In this Mansfield resembles the boy who points out that the em-
peror is wearing no clothes. Even if the boy's shirt-tail is hanging out,
the question is not what he is wearing but whether or not the emperor has
any clothes on and whether that ought to cause us concern. As Mansfield
demonstrates, the official interpreters of the Constitution (the United
States Supreme Court), with no significant objection from mainstream
scholars, have maintained an image of the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment that is not only wrong, but so obviously wrong that it is
difficult to understand how it could have been maintained for so long
with such success. To put it in a nutshell, the commonly accepted notion
is that our Founding Fathers, having had a bad experience with estab-
lished churches, enacted the First Amendment in order to place a wall
between church and state; accordingly, so it goes, both the letter of the
law and our unbroken tradition compel fidelity to this core principle of
the "American experiment."
Mansfield deliberately chooses not to mount an exhaustive legal or
historical case against this interpretation. Instead, the five chapters in
Mansfield's short book approach his subject by telling a series of stories,
each incorporating an actual historical event, but with the overarching
theme of puncturing some popular but misguided myth about the Estab-
lishment Clause. Chapter 1 tells the story of how the First Amendment
was adopted. Chapter 2 addresses the role of Thomas Jefferson in how
the Founding Fathers understood the relationship between church and
state, in particular the letter that Thomas Jefferson wrote to the Danbury
Baptist Association in which he used the phrase "wall of separation
HOW THE FOUNDING FATHERS TRIED TO PROTECT RELIGION IN AMERICA . . . AND WHAT'S
HAPPENED SINCE 146 (2007). Although he cites Robert Rutland's collection of Madison's papers
and the words he quotes do appear, they are separated by several intervening words, indeed pages,
and the omission is not acknowledged in the quotation. Although "Religion" is in Madison's Memo-
rial and Remonstrance, and Madison talks about "the basis and foundation of government," the
subject of the latter phrase is the Virginia Declaration of Rights, not "Religion." Id.
It turns out that the same quotation is found in DAVID BARTON'S book THE MYTH OF
SEPARATION 120 (3d ed. 1992) (1989), although he withdrew it from a later edition of the book,
ORIGINAL INTENT: THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, & RELIGION (1996). Rodda cites similar
examples of Mansfield's borrowing from the scholarship of David Barton, which is neither here nor
there in terms of the validity of Mansfield's argument, but it again suggests that in providing a
popular, as distinguished from scholarly, treatment of the subject Mansfield would have been wise to
obtain the assistance of a knowledgeable proofreader, who would have spared him a lot of grief. All
of this is unfortunate since the primary claims that Mansfield is making, as the rest of this review
describes, would not be affected by correcting the errors that are pounced upon by Mansfield's
critics.
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between church and state."2 Chapter 3 describes the opinion in Everson
v. Board of Education3 -the first decision by the United States Supreme
Court to treat the Jeffersonian phrase as the Rosetta Stone for interpret-
ing the First Amendment. Chapter 4 describes the rise of the ACLU and
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, and their use of
litigation, particularly the fee-shifting provisions in the United States
Code, to enforce the separationist vision. Finally, Chapter 5 is a bit of an
altar call-it describes how the distorted vision of a secular America can
and probably will be replaced by one that corresponds more closely to
the Founders' vision for America. Each chapter bears closer inspection.
Chapter 1, "What the Founders Founded," tells what should be the
well-known story of how the First Amendment was adopted. In the
popular mind, even in widely accepted scholarly treatments of the First
Amendment, the Founders self-consciously rejected the past practices of
the American colonies, which featured an overlap between religious and
governmental authority. As Frank Lambert, Professor of History at Pur-
due University, puts it in his book The Founding Fathers and the Place
of Religion in America, the attitude of the "Planting Fathers" contrasts
sharply with the vision of the "Founding Fathers." Whereas the Planting
Fathers wanted to establish a "City upon a Hill" and thought that religion
and state were inextricably linked,
The Founding Fathers had a radically different conception of reli-
gious freedom. Influenced by the Enlightenment, they had great con-
fidence in the individual's ability to understand the world and its
most fundamental laws through the exercise of his or her reason. To
them, true religion was not something handed down by a church or
contained in the Bible but rather was to be found through free ra-
tional inquiry. Drawing on radical Whig ideology, a body of thought
whose principal concern was expanded liberties, the framers sought
to secure their idea of religious freedom by barring any alliance be-
tween church and state.
4
2.
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God,
that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers
of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign rever-
ence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should
'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and State.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Associa-
tion (Jan. 1, 1802), in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 332, 332 (Adri-
erne Koch & William Peden eds., 1972) (1944). In fact the use of the phrase "wall of separation" in
this context originated with Roger Williams, who advocated a "hedge or wall of separation between
the garden of the church and the wilderness of the world." PERRY MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: HIS
CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN TRADITION 98 (Atheneum, 1962) (1953).
3. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
4. FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 3
(2003). This quotation was used (originally without attribution, presumably because it was not
thought to present anything particularly original), in a commencement address by Judge John E.
2007]
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(To mitigate some of the embarrassment from the anachronism on the
dust jacket of Mansfield's book, it is significant that Lambert places the
defining moments in our nation's history to be 1639 and 1787, thus blur-
ring the distinction between the adoption of the Constitution and the
adoption of the First Amendment. 5)
A brief consideration of Lambert's description illustrates the central
point that Mansfield makes in Chapter 1: We have the story fundamen-
tally wrong. Neither the Constitution written in 1787 nor the First
Amendment drafted in 1791 and ratified in 1791 "barr[ed] any alliance
between church and state." It would be more accurate to say that the
First Amendment protected those existing establishments of religion. In
fact, it was in part the fear that the national government would interfere
with state establishments of religion that produced the language of the
Establishment Clause-the ten tortured words.6
How could something so obvious as the purpose of the First
Amendment be turned on its head? One answer of course is that, regard-
less of what was intended by the First Amendment, later constitutional
developments, such as the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, might
have accomplished precisely what Lambert and others claim was in-
Jones, who decided Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
See Judge John E. Jones III, Commencement Address at Dickinson College (May 21, 2006),
http://www.dickinson.edu/commencement/2006/address.html.
5.
The constitution that [George Washington] swore to uphold was the work of another
group of America's progenitors, commonly known as the "Founding Fathers," who in
1787 drafted a constitution for the new nation. But unlike the work of the Puritan Fathers,
the federal constitution made no reference whatever to God or divine providence, citing
as its sole authority "the people of the United States." Further, its stated purposes were
secular, political ends: "to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty." Instead of building a "Christian Commonwealth," the supreme
law of the land established a secular state. The opening clause of its First Amendment in-
troduced the radical notion that the state had no voice concerning matters of conscience:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof." [citation omitted] In debating the language of that amendment, the
first House of Representatives rejected a Senate proposal that would have made possible
the establishment of the Christian religion or of some aspect of Christian orthodoxy. [ci-
tation omitted] There would be no Church of the United States. Nor would America rep-
resent itself to the world as a Christian Republic.
LAMBERT, supra note 4, at 2. Just as 1639 represents a defining moment in Americans' religious
heritage, so does 1787. ld.
6. See generally Van Alstyne, What is "'an Establishment of Religion"?, 65 N.C. L. REV.
909, 910 (1987) (suggesting that the intent of the First Amendment may have been simply to prevent
the federal government from usurping states' power to establish religion). Of course, the First
Amendment was also drafted to specify how the national government would deal with religion; it
could neither make a law that would establish religion, nor could it prohibit the free exercise of
religion. But in between those two extremes there was room for nonpreferential aid to religion and
nondiscriminatory enforcement of laws (e.g., against polygamy) that might impinge on the practice
of religion. It is not clear that the Founders had a clear conception of the appropriate boundaries to
be drawn in limiting government action affecting religion. Like many commentators, I have pro-
posed my own set of principles: David K. DeWolf, State Action under the Religion Clauses: Neu-
tral in Result or Neutral in Treatment?, 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 253 (1990).
BOOK REVIEW. TEN TORTURED WORDS
tended by the Founding Fathers. (Whether the Fourteenth Amendment,
or any other constitutional authority in fact did so is a significant part of
the discussion in Chapter 3 of Mansfield's book.) Even conceding, as
every examination of the First Amendment must, that the First Amend-
ment not only did not impose separation of church and state upon the
states, but prevented the federal government from interfering with the
establishment of religion or the suppression of the exercise of religion,
defenders of the popular understanding will say that the Fourteenth
Amendment changed the landscape. We will deal with that question
later in this review. But whatever was done in the late 1800's cannot be
used to interpret the intention of the Founding Fathers. To say that the
Founding Fathers "barr[ed] any alliance between church and state" is so
wildly inaccurate that one searches for other explanations of how such a
characterization could be made. Even the existence of established state
churches, of which there were five at the time of the Constitutional Con-
vention, 7 is not seen as irrefutable proof that the purpose of the First
Amendment was not to bar an alliance between church and state, but
rather is assumed to show that most states had by that time rejected the
idea of an established state church (from the time of Revolutionary War
broke out in 1775 until the Constitutional Convention the number of
colonies with established churches dropped from nine to five8).
By reading back into the Founding Fathers' later decision to aban-
don state establishments of religion, historians like Frank Lambert claim
for them an attitude that they simply did not share: that public life could
be governed by secular principles, while private life would be guided by
whatever source of spiritual sustenance the individual chose. It is pre-
cisely to refute this notion that Mansfield describes, albeit in abbreviated
and popular fashion, a more accurate history of how the First Amend-
ment was adopted and what it was intended to accomplish.
The most basic starting point for the First Amendment is to identify
the impetus for the Bill of Rights generally and the First Amendment in
particular. This part of the history is generally agreed upon: In the de-
bates over the ratification of the proposed constitution, the primary criti-
cism of the new constitution was that its grant of greater power to the
national government left the states and ordinary citizens vulnerable to the
usurpation of their rights and prerogatives. Although the Constitution in
theory granted only limited powers, history is replete with examples of
limited power turning into unlimited power, and the anti-federalists ar-
gued that the new Constitution offered precious little protection from yet
7. MANSFIELD, supra note 1, at 120, (citing ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 4 (1982)).
8. Id.
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another installment in that sorry history. 9 The defenders of the Constitu-
tion tried to reassure the state ratifying conventions that the Constitution
only gave the national government enumerated and limited powers, and
that it was more dangerous to specify limitations on that power, since
any omission from the list of limitations could be converted into a claim
of implied authority. But this argument in the end was successful only
by tying it to a promise that after the Constitution was ratified it would
be supplemented by a Bill of Rights in which explicit limitations were
placed upon the national government. The resulting "Gentleman's
Agreement" paved the way for the ratification of the Constitution.'0
In other words, it would be a mistake to characterize the Bill of
Rights as a guarantee of the rights of the people in general; instead it was
a limited protection against depredation by the national government. It
supplemented the enumerated powers limitation by further requiring that
even if the national government were engaged in an activity authorized
by Articles I, II or III of the Constitution, it could only do so within the
boundaries set up by the Bill of Rights. What is typically forgotten (or
deliberately obscured) in the popular telling of the story of the Bill of
Rights is that the states retained the power to do precisely those things
(establishing a state religion, punishing unpopular speech, denying the
right to trial by jury, etc.) that were forbidden to the national govern-
ment. Of course, that allocation of power may have been drastically al-
tered by subsequent events, but if so, we should locate the authority for
limiting state power in subsequent events, not in the design of the Foun-
ders.
Chapter 2 of TEN TORTURED WORDS, "Of Cheese, Walls, and
Churches," addresses the role that Thomas Jefferson played in the erec-
tion of the wall between church and state. He is significant for two rea-
sons. First, he is the author of the phrase "wall of separation between
church and state"; and second, he is iconic of the mind of the Founders.
More than almost any of the Founders, he is given credit for verbalizing
the beliefs that led to the Revolution, to the adoption of the Constitution,
and to the Bill of Rights. Jefferson of course was the primary author of
the Declaration of Independence, but he was in France when the Consti-
tutional Convention met, as well as when the First Amendment was
drafted, debated, and adopted (although he returned in time to observe its
ratification). But when President John F. Kennedy made the famous
remark in front of forty-nine Nobel Laureates that the combined talent
and human knowledge assembled in the room were exceeded only by the
9. See, e.g., Thomas B. McAfee, Restoring the Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: The
Presumption in Favor of Liberty over Law and the Court over the Constitution, 75 U. CrN. L. REV.
1499, 1560-61 (2007).
10. Under this "Gentleman's Agreement," "the federalists made important concessions, and in
exchange, the moderates agreed to support the Constitution." Robert G. Natelson, The Original
Meaning of the Establishment Clause, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 73, 82 (2005).
[Vol. 85:2
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occasions when Thomas Jefferson dined alone," he exemplified the kind
of reverence in which Jefferson is held in the public understanding of the
American experiment. Thus, if Jefferson was indeed a passionate separa-
tionist, that fact (in addition to the phrase he composed) might affect our
understanding of the Founders' vision for the way in which religion and
government would coexist in the new republic.
Mansfield approaches the subject by telling the story of the Dan-
bury Baptists to whom the letter was written. On the same day that Jef-
ferson wrote the letter to the Danbury Baptists, he had publicly wel-
comed the arrival of a half-ton of cheese that was the gift of another
group of New England Baptists, from Cheshire, Massachusetts, anxious
to express their affection and support for a President they thought might
sympathize with their plight of being a minority religion in a state that
still recognized Congregationalism as the official state religion.' 2 In-
deed, Jefferson did sympathize with them, and it is clear from the letter
that Jefferson favored a much more restrictive role for government in
promoting religion. On the other hand, Mansfield makes two important
points. First, although Jefferson claims in his letter that the First
Amendment was an act of the whole American people "building a wall
of separation between church and state," this statement should not be
taken (as it has been since the Everson opinion, addressed by Mansfield
in Chapter 3) as an authoritative description of the purpose, much less
the legal effect, of the First Amendment.
Mansfield reviews the basic, almost irrefutable, reasons for refusing
to accord such weight to Jefferson's phrase. First, Mansfield recalls the
history of the origin of the First Amendment, previously described in
Chapter 1. It was not to satisfy separationists (assuming Jefferson to be
one) that the amendment was proposed, but precisely to prevent separa-
tionist impulses (or for that matter, sectarian impulses) in the national
government from interfering with whatever approach to religion (includ-
ing state establishment of religion) then prevailed in the several states.
Second, Jefferson took no part in the actual drafting of the First Amend-
ment, and thus could not be considered an authoritative source for what
was meant by the language of the amendment. Third, the letter to the
Danbury Baptist Association was written long after the amendment had
been drafted, passed, and ratified, and at a time when Jefferson occupied
a political office. As a politician Jefferson was entitled, even obligated,
to advance a more partisan agenda than the one he advocated when he
occupied the more statesman-like role as one of the Founding Fathers.
Finally, when Jefferson referred to the wall between "church and State,"
he probably meant "State" to mean the national government (which is the
11. Remarks at a Dinner Honoring Nobel Prize Winners of the Western Hemisphere, 1962
PUB. PAPERS 347 (Apr. 29, 1962).
12. Connecticut did not abandon Congregationalism until 1818; Massachusetts did so in 1833.
MANSFIELD, supra note 1, at 120.
2007]
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target of the First Amendment), not our more generic understanding of
"state" as governmental power in general.
But I would like to amplify a point that Mansfield makes by draw-
ing on the rules of interpretation in a legal context. When a contract is
being made between two parties, the meaning of the contract depends
upon the external manifestations of the parties, not any hidden subjective
intent. Suppose my neighbor loves to burn wood in his fireplace but
lacks any ready supply of firewood. I, by contrast, have lots of firewood.
On the other hand, I would prefer (if I did not need money) to leave my
property in its natural state. Suppose he and I walk through my property
identifying firewood that would meet his needs, and we subsequently
enter into a contract that states "In exchange for $500, Neighbor has the
right to collect a one-year supply of firewood for his personal use from
DeWolf's property." If a subsequent court is required to interpret this
contract (as to the amount of firewood contemplated by "personal use,"
or what equipment Neighbor may use in harvesting the firewood), a court
will look at the objective manifestations of my behavior; the fact that I
believe that wood-burning is a form of air pollution, or that I hate chain
saws, will form no part of the "intent of the parties" reflected in the con-
tract. 13  Even if I wrote the words to the contract that we both signed, it
is my actions (including words I spoke in the formation of the contract),
not what I subjectively thought or believed, that will control. Thus, even
if Jefferson had been an author of the First Amendment, or others sharing
his point of view (like Madison14) were key contributors to the language
of the Constitution or the First Amendment, it was the representation of
its meaning to the ratifying state conventions that determines what the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights meant from a legal standpoint. Once
it became clear that the lack of a Bill of Rights was a major stumbling
block to securing approval of the Constitution, and after the proponents
of the Constitution promised that the addition of a Bill of Rights would
be the first order of business for the new Congress, the Constitution was
ratified.' 5 Thus, the meaning of the First Amendment is not to be found
13. On the other hand, the intention of the Neighbor may be relevant, if it is either expressed
(thus forming part of the basis of the agreement) or if it can be demonstrated that the actual intent of
one of the parties is so different from what the other party thought the bargain was about. In the case
of the ratifiers of the First Amendment, they clearly thought that the Bill of Rights was the payment
on the promissory note executed by the Federalists to secure ratification of the Constitution. See
Natelson, supra note 10, at 82-84, 87.
14. Madison's subjective intent, based on writings he produced in other contexts, is often
cited as the meaning of the First Amendment, but it is clear that despite Madison's preeminent role
in the drafting and the historical record of the Constitutional Convention and the drafting of the Bill
of Rights, Madison frequently acted as a facilitator and his personal preference was frequently set
aside by the majority. For example, Madison favored giving the national government the power to
override state actions that violated individual liberties, but the majority wanted to retain the auton-
omy of the states. I ANNALS OF CONG. 440-42 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); see generally Natelson,
supra note 9.
15. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 37-38 (Random House
2005).
[Vol. 85:2450
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in the subjective intent of those who put the words on paper, but in the
communicated demands of the state ratifying conventions, who made it
clear that they wanted to protect the states and individual citizens from
having the national government tell them what to do; the power of the
states to regulate their own relationship with the people was to be left
undisturbed.' 6 At the risk of becoming repetitious, this is the principle
that has been stood on its head in the frequent citation of Jefferson and
other Founders as the origin of a "right" to prevent the endorsement of
religion by state or local governments.
Mansfield also spends considerable time exploring Jefferson's true
feelings about religion in general and Christianity in particular, and
whether he can properly be claimed for the Deist or even the infidel posi-
tion. Mansfield cites a number of sources suggesting that Jefferson was
more pious than is popularly assumed, 17 and that his theological beliefs,
while less orthodox than those of the other Founders, were not a place-
holder for the kind of militant secularism that is being advanced today.
The debate is likely to continue about Jefferson, and this part of the book
is less persuasive precisely because in the end it hardly matters. Jeffer-
son was likely a conflicted soul, who found himself unable to affirm key
tenets of orthodox Christianity, and feared the influence on civil society
of religious institutions,' 8 but he never disputed (and seems to have
agreed with) the assumption that religious belief was critical to maintain-
ing a republican form of government. When John Adams said that our
form of government required a religious people, 19 or when George Wash-
ington's Farewell Address reminded his listeners that to subvert religion
and morality would be to abandon true patriotism,2 0 they were expressing
16. As one example, while the Constitution prohibited the national government from employ-
ing a religious test for public office (Article VI), in 1789 "[a]ccording to one tally, eleven of the
thirteen states had religious qualifications for officeholding." AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 33 (Yale University Press 1998).
17. Mansfield repeats the story of Jefferson's encountering someone on his way to church and
assuring him that "no nation has ever yet existed or been governed without religion. Nor can be."
MANSFIELD, supra note I, at 49-50. Critics of Mansfield have accused him of exaggerating Jeffer-
son's personal piety and relying on apocryphal accounts. See RODDA, supra note 1 ("I have to
wonder if this best-selling author even realizes that he is spreading an inaccurate and deceptive
version of American history to a new and wider audience."). But the quotation is believed by many
competent historians to be reliable. See GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ONE NATION, Two CULTURES 86
(2001) (based on "recently discovered handwritten history of a Washington parish"); see also James
H. Huston, James H. Huston Responds, THE WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY, 3rd Ser., Vol. 56,
No. 4. Oct., 1999, at 823-824.
18. "History, I believe, furnishes no example of a priest-ridden people maintaining a free civil
government. This marks the lowest grade of ignorance of which their civil as well as religious lead-
ers will always avail themselves for their own purposes." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Baron
von Humboldt (Dec. 6, 1813), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?amrnem/
mtj:@field(DOCID+@lit(tj 110127)).
19. "Our constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate
to the government of any other." MANSFIELD, supra note 1, at 144; John Adams, To the Officers of
the First Brigade of the Third Division of the Militia of Massachusetts (Oct. 11, 1798), in 9 THE




DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
an almost universally shared belief, even if there was passionate debate
over whether it was a proper object of government to encourage such
belief. Jefferson may have defended the position that not one penny of
government support should be furnished to religious institutions, but he
was not indifferent to the benefits from religion, either on a personal
level or as a basis for political stability. But regardless of how he recon-
ciled the conflict these sentiments might have created, Jefferson's views
ultimately have precious little to say about the meaning of the First
Amendment.
This logically takes us to Chapter 3, "The Turning," which focuses
on the case in which Jefferson's phrase and the separationist view was
adopted by the United States Supreme Court. Again, Mansfield begins
with a story-the story of the murder of a Catholic priest in Alabama in
1921 and the lawyer who successfully appealed to the religious and ra-
cial biases of the jury in securing an acquittal for the murderer. The law-
yer subsequently joined the Ku Klux Klan-and later the Supreme
Court.2 1 The lawyer of course was Hugo Black, and in many ways his
fleeting membership in the Ku Klux Klan is irrelevant to the opinion he
wrote in 1947 approving tax-supported reimbursement of bus transporta-
tion for Catholic school students. But part of Mansfield's purpose in
telling the story is to dislodge the sort of reverence that has been ac-
corded to the string of U.S. Supreme Court opinions imposing stringent
limitations on governmental support of religion.
Most lawyers, but few lay people, know the story of how the Estab-
lishment Clause was first invoked as a limitation on what state or local
government could do to support religion. In Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion of Ewing Township,22 a group of taxpayers challenged a school dis-
trict's policy of reimbursing parents for the cost of bus fares to transport
their children to school, including both the public high schools and "the
Catholic schools." Justice Black wrote the majority opinion, which
framed the issue as whether or not the policy violated the "wall of sepa-
ration between church and state" mandated by the Constitution. Justice
Black (along with the rest of the Court) assumed that the First Amend-
ment, by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, made it unconstitutional to
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality
are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of Patriotism who
should labor to subvert these great Pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the
duties of men and citizens .... Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined
education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect
that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.
GEORGE WASHINGTON, FAREWELL ADDRESS (Sept. 19, 1796), reprinted in 1 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 205, 212 (New York, Bureau of Nat'l Literature
1897), available at http://gwpapers.virginia.edu/documents/farewell/transcript.html.
21. An account of the trial and controversy over Hugo Black's Klan membership can be found
in William H. Pryor, Jr., The Murder of Father James Coyle, the Prosecution of Edwin Stephenson,
and the True Calling of Lawyers, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 401, 407 (2006).
22. 330 U.S. I (1947).
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"contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which teaches
the tenets and faith of any church., 23 Having laid down the principle,
Black's opinion proceeded to apply it to the facts of the case, and con-
cluded that the policy was not a support to the schools, but rather was an
extension of "general state law benefits." 24 Only four of the other mem-
bers of the court agreed with him; the other four vigorously dissented,
finding that in meeting the transportation needs of the Catholic school
students, the school board was supporting the religious mission of the
school. In arguing over the application of the principle to the facts of the
case, no one questioned the way in which the principle was expressed, or
its application of the First Amendment to the actions of state and local
government.
Mansfield spends several pages reviewing the legitimate questions
that can be raised about whether the 14th Amendment was intended to
reverse the logic of the original Bill of Rights and disable the states in
precisely the same way that the federal government was disabled by the
Bill of Rights.25 There are good reasons to be skeptical, including the
contemporaneous rejection of this argument in several U.S. Supreme
26Court cases. Moreover, particularly in the case of the religion clauses,
the logic of the First Amendment (preventing the national government
from interfering with states' regulation of religion) makes no sense if one
simply substitutes "state" for "Congress" (or "national government").
Finally, as Mansfield demonstrates through the opinion of Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist in Wallace v. Jaffree,27 the "wall of separation" metaphor
has proven to be unworkable in practice as well as being based on a mis-
reading of history. But the debate over the incorporation doctrine is vo-
luminous and complex; even if one rejected the rationale presented in
Everson-and Mansfield explains why one should-one might legiti-
mately ask whether there is a substitute principle that limits the power of
state or local government to promote or suppress religious belief and
practice. The lack of such a principle may help explain the perpetuation
of the stunning anachronism of using the language and intentions of Jef-
ferson and Madison as the basis for imposing constitutional limits on tax
support for parochial schools. But it is not Mansfield's purpose--or his
responsibility-to reconfigure the law defining the limits of governmen-
tal action affecting religion. His object was to correct an inaccurate ac-
count of our history, and in this he succeeds quite well.
Nonetheless, because Mansfield did not attempt a lawyer's argu-
ment about the Constitution, I cannot resist an avenue that would have
23. Id. atl6.
24. Id.
25. See the discussion in text accompanying notes 8 and 9.
26. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). See generally Jerold H. Israel, Selective
Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 256 (1982).
27. 472 U.S. 38, 66 (1985).
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shed a slightly different light on Justice Black's opinion. To use one of
the basic tools of legal analysis, Justice Black's claims regarding the
incorporation doctrine and Jefferson's wall of separation were plainly
dicta-that is, they were not necessary to the holding of the case and thus
did not constitute binding precedent, even under the principle of stare
decisis. In fact, the next case to address the issue of state aid to religious
schools, Board of Education v. Allen,28 was not decided until twenty
years later, and it too permitted state aid to parochial schools in the form
of providing textbooks. Thus, although the Court had used language that
sounded very threatening to the type of non-preferentialist support for
religion that Mansfield persuades us the Founders would have permitted,
the Court had protected such aid from constitutional attack for almost a
quarter century after the Everson case. In fact, in the Allen case the
Court explicitly rejected the argument made by Justice Black in a furious
dissent that aiding the educational mission of the parochial school vio-
lated the constitutional prohibitions in a way that transporting children in
the Ewing Township did not.29 Only in 1971, in the famous decision of
Lemon v. Kurtzman (source of the so-called Lemon test), 30 did the U.S.
Supreme Court for the first time invalidate state aid based upon the dicta
in Everson.31  Thus, in seeking the guilty party for'the unworkable
Lemon test one might turn more readily to Chief Justice Burger's mis-
placed pragmatism in Lemon than to the bad history found in Justice
Black's dicta in Everson.
Mansfield doesn't follow this branch of the Everson progeny, but
instead cites the myriad examples of the arbitrary application of the
Lemon test. The Lemon test is not the only judicially formulated rule that
is vulnerable to criticism, but it helps to prove Mansfield's point about
the significance of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence having been
built upon a bad foundation. It is particularly ironic that those who de-
fend decisions protecting the "wall of separation between church and
state" often treat this phrase as though it were the cornerstone upon
which the republic was built and that abandoning it would constitute
28. 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968).
29. See DeWolf, supra note 6, at 253.
30. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). Under the Lemon test, a state action is unconstitutional
unless (1) it has a secular purpose; (2) it has a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; and (3) it does not result in excessive entanglement between the state and religion. Id
31. It is true that the U.S. Supreme Court had invalidated religious instruction on school
grounds and state-sponsored school prayer. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205
(1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433-36 (1962); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,
231-32 (1948). But these could be distinguished in that they were the direct involvement of the state
in religious practice or instruction. Everson and Allen appeared to countenance governmental aid
flowing to religious organizations as long as the aid was available on a neutral basis and did not
require entanglement with the religious aspect of the schools. Thus, Lemon, while it incorporated
the dicta from Everson, was in sharp contrast to the actual legal precedent. Moreover, it was flatly
inconsistent with its companion case, Tilton v. Richardson, which permitted state aid to flow almost
without restriction to religious colleges and universities. 403 U.S. 672, 687-88 (1971). See gener-
ally DeWolf, supra note 6, at 253.
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capitulation of constitutional principle in favor of mob rule. As Mans-
field points out, however, nothing could be further from the truth. Most
Americans are quite happy with a general policy of keeping religious
authority and governmental authority separate; but they also puzzled by
the zeal with which religious expression has been excluded from the pub-
lic square. When the U.S. Supreme Court insists on counting reindeer in
a "winter holiday" display32 or agonizes over the placement of the Ten
Commandments on government property, they cannot claim the authority
of the Founders.
Mansfield then moves on in Chapter 4, "Faith-Based Blackmail," to
detail the way in which litigating Establishment Clause cases has become
a cottage industry for organizations like the American Civil Liberties
Union and Americans United for Separation of Church and State. Again,
he begins with a story. The protagonist in this chapter is an ACLU attor-
ney inspired by his hero Cesar Chavez, who started his legal career fight-
ing the good fight for union workers and civil rights. He eventually grew
disillusioned with the ACLU's use of techniques that capitalize on the
"fee-shifting" provisions of the civil rights laws. 33  Fee-shifting was
originally a device to insure that victims of racial discrimination would
be able to enforce the civil rights laws, but today it is applied to a much
broader set of cases.
It works like this: If the policy or practices of a public entity, say a
school board, are challenged by the ACLU,34 that public entity faces a
scary prospect. If the case is litigated, and the school board loses, it will
be forced to pay the attorney fees incurred by the ACLU in litigating the
case. On the other hand, if the school board succeeds in defending its
policy or practices, it has no statutory right to recover its fees, and it will
still incur the expense of hiring its own lawyers. Since the ACLU is of-
ten able to recruit volunteer lawyers who will pursue the case pro bono
based on their commitment to the agenda of the ACLU, there is a huge
risk on one side and very little risk on the other. It is no surprise that
where the legal status of the policy is in the least doubtful, the school
board will have a strong incentive to capitulate.
32. In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the Supreme Court narrowly upheld a
"seasonal display" by the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, which included a creche along with Santa
Claus and reindeer. In describing the difficulty of applying the test for what violates the Establish-
ment Clause, Judge Nelson of the Sixth Circuit complained:
The application of such a test may prove troublesome in practice. Will a mere Santa
Claus suffice, or must there also be a Mrs. Claus? Are reindeer needed? If so, will one do
or must there be a full complement of eight? Or is it now nine? Where in the works of
Story, Cooley or Tribe are we to find answers to constitutional questions such as these?
Am. Civil Liberties Union v. City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561, 1569 (6th Cir. 1986) (Nelson, J.,
dissenting).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006).
34. The same principle applies to litigation brought by Americans United for Separation of
Church and State and similar organizations, and in some cases more than one group will work to-
gether, as they did in the case of Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School Board, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 709-
710 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 1 will use the ACLU as the prime example for convenience.
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Now it is only fair to point out that religious groups have used this
same "fee-shifting" provision of the law to extract attorney fees from
public entities, including school boards, that violated the First Amend-
ment by, for example, refusing to provide equal access to student groups
with religious viewpoints.35 One might conclude from this fact that the
law operates symmetrically-that is, it is no more permissible (and there-
fore incurs a symmetrical risk) to discriminate against religion as to dis-
criminate for religion. But this appearance of symmetry is deceptive.
The best way to illustrate this is by example. I have often had occasion
to reflect on the Establishment Clause during the choir performances at
the public schools my children have attended. For the "Winter Holiday"
concert, the director must select music suitable to the season. A natural
candidate would be Christmas music-religious music. What is the rela-
tive likelihood that a federal judge would find the selection unconstitu-
tional if the percentage of Christmas carols (traditional Christian music)
were 0%? 25%? 50%? 100%? It seems inconceivable that a parent
who complained that none of the songs had religious content would suc-
ceed in obtaining an injunction and attorney fees.36 On the other hand, if
100% of the songs were Christmas carols, it would be very easy to claim
that the policy constituted an endorsement of Christianity.37 We have
been acclimated to the consequences of a school district appearing to be
"too religious." But imagine for a moment if federal judges started pun-
ishing school districts for being "insufficiently religious" with injunc-
tions and huge attorney fee awards. One can hear the-justified-howls
of outrage. Yet precisely that is what has happened (with the identities
reversed) when a school district has been found to be "too religious."
For example, when the Dover, Pennsylvania School Board adopted a
policy requiring that students hear a four-paragraph statement about in-
telligent design at the beginning of their study of evolution, it was sued
35. See, e.g., Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. Five, 470 F.3d
1062, 1074 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding defendant school district's denial of access to school facilities
based upon discrimination against plaintiff's religious viewpoint entitled plaintiff to recoup attorney
fees).
36. Sechler v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 121 F. Supp. 2d 439, 453 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (discuss-
ing how a "winter holiday" "song program" at public elementary school that featured Kwanzaa and
Chanukah songs, but no songs reflecting the Christian origin of the Christmas holiday, was not a
violation of the Establishment Clause).
37. School districts are very sensitive to the accusation that their inclusion of religious music
or religious art might create the impression of an establishment of religion. See, e.g., Florey v. Sioux
Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 619 F.2d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding school district policy that permits
singing of Christmas carols was not unconstitutional on its face). However, perfect neutrality is
impossible. When my oldest son was in the sixth grade the "Winter Holiday" concert at his elemen-
tary school featured each grade in succession, from youngest kindergarten to 6th grade, singing a
variety of secular and religious carols. Just before the last number on the program the students put
on white gloves, which puzzled me. Then they began to sing Silent Night, which I thought was very
fitting. But after the first verse, the stage lights went out and the students were bathed in black light.
All that could be seen was their white gloves, and while the accompanist played the music to Silent
Night, the students silently "sang" the words in sign language. I was moved to tears. I felt great
admiration for the bravery of the choir teacher, but reflected bitterly on the fact that my reaction
could be Exhibit A in a suit to attack the practice under the Establishment Clause.
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and lost. After trial they were threatened with a $2 million attorney fee
bill, and settled by paying over $1 million.38
In terms of the title of Chapter 4, "Faith-Based Blackmail," lest it
appear to be an exaggeration or hyperbole, consider these words from the
lawyer who succeeded in forcing the Dover School Board to abandon its
policy of telling students about intelligent design: "This sends a message
to other school districts contemplating intelligent design that the price tag
can be truly substantial ... Precisely. If school boards were being
threatened with similar penalties for not being sufficiently religious, what
would we call such a legal climate? Faith-based blackmail? Should we
not be just as outraged if the identities were reversed?
Lest Mansfield's readers end on a note of despair, he includes a fifth
chapter, "The Return." In it he sounds an optimistic note based on two
converging phenomena. On the one hand, we have the public appetite
for religion resulting from the 9/11 tragedy and other reminders of our
individual and corporate need for God. On the other, we have militant
atheism represented by such figures as Christopher Hitchens40 and Rich-
ard Dawkins,4' who agree with religious believers that religious ideas
matter, but they disagree with the Founders about whether religious be-
lief has a positive effect on the body politic. Until recently religious be-
lief had been relegated by the cultural elite to the status of a personal
preference-a leftover from a bygone era that might provide individuals
with a source of comfort and reassurance in times of stress, but that was
largely irrelevant to the important questions of how we should live.42
Hitchens, Dawkins, and others have reminded Americans that ideas do
have consequences, and that our Founders' conviction about the relation-
ship between religious belief and our body politic deserves renewed at-
tention.
This relationship-between the religious imagination and public
policy-is one that Mansfield emphasizes throughout the book. Every
American war has been fought not only by soldiers, but with the help of
clergy who helped Americans understand what the fight was all about.
38. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 709. The attorney team representing the parents claimed
that their fees were over $2 million, but they agreed to settle with the school board for over $1 mil-
lion. Amy Worden, Dover District to Pay $1 million in Legal Fees, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Feb.
22, 2006, at B01; see also David K. DeWolf, John West, and Casey Luskin, Intelligent Design will
Survive Kitzmiller v. Dover, 68 MONT. L. REV. 7, 8 (2007).
39. Worden, supra note 38, at B01 (quoting Richard Katskee, attorney for Americans United
for Separation of Church and State).
40. CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT: How RELIGION POISONS EVERYTHING
(2007).
41. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION (2006).
42. This view is aptly summarized in the James Taylor song, "Sweet Baby James": "There's a
song that they sing of their home in the sky / Maybe you can believe it if it helps you to sleep / But
singing works just fine for me." JAMES TAYLOR, Sweet Baby James, on SWEET BABY JAMES (War-
ner Bros. Records 1990) (1970), available at http://www.lyricsfreak.com/j/james+taylor/
sweet+baby+james_20069087.html.
2007]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Even in the Civil War, when opposing armies each had chaplains reas-
suring the troops that they were doing God's will,43 it has never been
thought that religion was just a private matter. It is relatively easy to find
the kinds of statements from John Adams and Washington connecting
religious belief to survival as a nation, but even in recent history religion
was a driving force behind the civil rights movement," and it appears
that Americans take religion into account when they choose their elected
representatives. 45  Mansfield predicts that "[t]he next presidential elec-
tion promises to be a contest of religious worldviews as much as, if not
more than, any other in American history." 46 Mansfield's prediction is
subject to being proven wrong (and it is hard to imagine how one would
rigorously test such a hypothesis), but it may also prove prophetic.
Mansfield is encouraged to note a number of legislative efforts that
would help restore balance in our approach to the role of religion in pub-
lic life. One initiative, House Bill 2679, the Public Expression of Relig-
ion Act, was passed by the House of Representatives in 2006."7 It would
prevent the fee-shifting provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 from applying to
cases involving the Establishment Clause. Another initiative, House Bill
235, the Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act, would remove
the threat of the loss of non-profit tax-deductible status on the part of
churches when they address political issues, particularly the conduct of
politicians when their policies encourage or conflict with a church's view
of what God demands of the nation.48 Since the time that Old Testament
prophets warned about God's expectations and the consequences of dis-
regarding them, religious leaders have claimed the right, indeed the obli-
gation, to "speak truth to power." Although some religious leaders be-
43. As Abraham Lincoln's Second Inaugural noted, with some bitter irony:
Both read the same Bible and pray to the same God, and each invokes His aid against the
other. It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God's assistance in
wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces, but let us judge not, that we be
not judged. The prayers of both could not be answered. That of neither has been an-
swered fully. The Almighty has His own purposes.
Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (March 4, 1865).
44. CHARLES MARSH, GOD'S LONG SUMMER: STORIES OF FAITH AND CIVIL RIGHTS passim
(Princeton University Press 1997); Barbara L. Bezdek, To Attain "The Just Rewards of So Much
Struggle": Local-Resident Equity Participation in Urban Revitalization, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37,
94 n.260 (2006) ("[T]he recurring potent grass-roots forces in popular movements for economic
inclusion-justice under law-have been religious leaders and congregants."). For a recent example
of the involvement of religious leaders in a political/legal struggle, see Reverend Nelson Johnson,
Reflections on an Attempt to Build "Authentic Community" in the Greensboro Kmart Labor Strug-
gle, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 675, 675 (2000).
45. Sam Harris, an author of one of the militantly atheist books, complained about a poll in
which 90% of Americans said they would vote for an otherwise qualified candidate who was female,
Jewish, or black, and 79% would vote for a gay candidate; however, only 37% of Americans would
vote for an atheist candidate, otherwise qualified. Nicholas D. Kristof, A Modest Proposal for a
Truce on Religion, N.Y. TIMES, December 3, 2006, § 4, at 13.
46. MANSFIELD, supra note 1, at 130.
47. The Public Expression of Religion Act, H.R. 2679, 109th Cong. § 2(b) (2005).
48. Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 235, 109th Cong. § 1(a)
(2005).
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lieve that it is imprudent, indeed unbiblical, to make specific pro-
nouncements about the wisdom of particular political practices, the
judgment about what is morally required (as distinguished from politi-
cally wise) is essentially a theological judgment, and it should be no part
of the government's jurisdiction to substitute its judgment for what topics
the preacher should address. If a government bureaucracy (the Internal
Revenue Service) is given the authority to withdraw significant benefits
(the right to deduct contributions from one's taxes) because of com-
plaints that the church "is too much involved in politics," we should rec-
ognize that religious liberty is seriously jeopardized. As Mansfield
points out, this is bad not only for religion, but for government. If gov-
ernment is denied the unique perspective that religious traditions provide
(and in light of the limited influence that religious leaders exert in com-
parison to other influences on the electorate), we are the poorer for it.
But that brings us back to the question which is bound to result from
Mansfield's analysis. If the popular view of the First Amendment is
wrong, and if our public discourse would benefit from correcting the
misperception that religious expression somehow turns toxic in the pub-
lic square, where will we find the boundary between appropriate and
inappropriate interaction between government and religion? Should a
state be able to establish a religion? Should it be able to provide non-
preferential support to all religions? Can a city deny Wiccans the right to
worship? Mansfield is not a constitutional lawyer, and it is perhaps un-
fair to ask him to come up with a tidy and inclusive legal doctrine. It is
of course permissible to imagine the solution our Founders adopted: Let
individual states develop their own unique solutions to the problem.
Given the protection of religious liberty in many state constitutions and
our historical experience with a tradition of tolerance, we may be confi-
dent that, even if there were no federal constitutional doctrine prohibiting
state interference with religious liberty, there is not much to worry about.
Even if there were individual departures from what most Americans
would favor, such departures might be permitted based on the principle
that Louis Brandeis articulated: "It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country. 49 On the other hand, perhaps
some general protection might be found in the Fourteenth Amendment to
the effect that if some state practice is so egregious that it violates "privi-
leges and immunities of citizens, 50 then a federal court has authority to
prevent such abuse; but this power would be used sparingly rather than
creating a cottage industry for litigation.
49. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: "Converse-1983 " in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229,
1233 (1994).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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This brings up the third of the solutions Mansfield reviews, a sort of
"nuclear option" for religion clause cases. The appellate jurisdiction of
the federal courts 5' is subject to being withdrawn, or selectively with-
drawn (via the "exceptions" clause 52) by Congress. Thus, at least in the-
ory, Congress could declare that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction
to hear cases involving school prayer, or public displays of religious
symbols. Ron Paul, a candidate in the 2008 Presidential campaign, has
sponsored the We the People Act, House Bill 5739,53 which would re-
move the jurisdiction of federal courts, including the Supreme Court,
from "any claim involving the laws, regulations, or policies of any State
or unit of local government relating to the free exercise or establishment
of religion., 54 Mansfield is not wedded to any of the three proposals. He
is confident that even if all of them fail, "others like them will surely
arise. The sense in the nation that something has gone horribly wrong in
matters of religion and government is too pronounced for the current
status quo to remain much longer." 55  Given the fact that the Everson
case has been around for sixty years, and similar measures in the past
have come to naught, one might question Mansfield's confidence. But
those who would view the measures as extreme ought not be complacent.
If Mansfield is correct (as I believe he is) that today's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is based on a series of demonstrably false premises,
and if he is also correct (as virtually everyone would concede, albeit for
different reasons) that current "Establishment Clause jurisprudence" is an
incoherent mess, then the prospect of significant, even dramatic, change
becomes more plausible. The development of a persuasive alternative
method for deciding Establishment Clause cases will make it much more
likely that such change will occur. Twenty years ago I proposed a modi-
fied version of Philip Kurland's neutrality rule,56 and I still would prefer
51. The Supreme Court is given original jurisdiction over certain types of cases: those "af-
fecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party."
U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2. However, virtually all the cases involving freedom of religion arise as a
result of the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the U.S. Supreme Court. Even the jurisdiction of
the lower federal courts (what the Constitution refers to as "inferior courts" -trial courts and courts
of appeal) is in the plenary control of Congress: "The judicial power of the United States, shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § I (emphasis added). Congress in theory could abolish
federal trial and appellate courts, or authorize them for limited types of cases.
52. After describing the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, Article III, § 2 states, "In
all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to
law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
53. We the People Act, H.R. 5739, 109th Cong. § 3(l)(a) (2006). In the Senate an equivalent
bill, S. 520, has been sponsored by Senator Shelby. The Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S.
520, 109th Cong. § 101(a) (2005).
54. MANSFIELD, supra note 1, at 127.
55. Id. at 129.
56. DeWolf, supra note 6, at 254-59. In essence, I proposed that state action be judged ac-
cording to whether it treated religion neutrally, permitting state aid to religion so long as it was
available on a neutral basis regardless of viewpoint. I contrasted this standard with what I called the
"affirmative action" model, prohibiting aid to religion wherever it was perceived that "too much"
benefit was inuring to religion. I also proposed that a neutrality rule would allow "secular space" for
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it to the current state of affairs and to virtually all of the substantive pro-
posals that have been proposed to bring order out of the current chaos.
But some ingenuity and political savvy will be required to identify the
thread by which we may escape this labyrinth.
Mansfield concludes with an epilogue that invokes the history of the
Berlin Wall. As Mansfield puts it, "there is another wall whose time has
come to an end.",57 He is quick to point out that it is not the wall of sepa-
ration between the institutions of church and state that needs to be torn
down; rather, it is the wall "that is assumed to stand between all govern-
ment and all religion." 58 Mansfield wants to return to the vision of the
Founders, in which the nation "welcomes the riches of faith into the pub-
lic sphere":
This is the dream of a new generation and not because [its members]
wish to religiously oppress their neighbors. Instead, they know that
the secular State has been tried and found wanting in their time, and
they wish for an age in which, as Dr. King dared to hope, religion
once again becomes the conscience of the State.59
Mansfield draws upon the Berlin Wall metaphor for another reason.
Not only was it an instrument of oppression, but it came down relatively
suddenly. Even those who bitterly opposed it had reason to think it was
more or less permanent. Its collapse also left a number of very difficult
practical problems to resolve. The abandonment of our current approach
to the First Amendment would also create practical difficulties, but a
false sense of complacency or security may arise from thinking that such
problems logically entail preservation of the status quo. Thus, Mansfield
may be right in thinking that the future may be dramatically different
from the past.
To summarize, Mansfield's aim in writing this book was to present
the origin of the Establishment Clause (and the misused phrase "wall of
separation between church and state") in a lively and persuasive way. In
this he has succeeded. A previous book about George Bush sold over a
million copies,60 and Mansfield may get a similar audience for this book.
Despite its cosmetic flaws, the book may serve as a catalyst, or at least
reflects a larger cultural hunger, for the adoption of a more sensible ap-
proach to the relationship between religion and government in America.
religion, including special zoning rules for churches, chaplains in the military, and accommodation
for religious practice (like prayer) where it furthered the state's interests.
57. MANSFIELD, supra note 1, at 138.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 138-39.
60. STEPHEN MANSFIELD, THE FAITH OF GEORGE W. BUSH (2004).
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